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PROCEDURE UNDER THE UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT'
BERNARD C. GAvIT*
Two members of the South Bend Bar, G. A. Farabaugh and
Walter R. Arnold, several years ago published an article in the
Indiana Law Journal in which they discussed the Indiana statute
on the subject of declaratory judgments.2 Upon practically all
of the points to which those gentlemen addressed themselves I
could hope to add nothing. I have only one query as to any of
their conclusions, and my main purpose is to supplement what
they have done; for in their article, nor in any other that I
have discovered, is there any serious discussion of the procedural
problems involved. Two principal questions present themselves:
first, is a jury trial necessary in every, or any proceeding under
the act; and second, does the code of pleading and practice in
this state apply to proceedings under the act? My query' as to
their conclusion is this: is it true that the act confers on the
Justice of the Peace courts in Indiana jurisdiction of proceedings under the act? 3
I.
Before we can intelligibly discuss those problems, however, it
is necessary to go back and look at the substantive side of the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.

'The substance of this paper was originally presented at a meeting
of the South Bend Bar Association in March, 1932. The Indiana Statute
on the subject is found in Sec. 680.1-680.16 Burns, 1929.
23 Ind. L. J. 351, 444 (1928).
3 Farabaugh and Arnold came to the conclusion that the act applied to
them. 3 Ind. L. J. at 361.
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situation. It is impossible, as a practical matter, to separate
substance and procedure. We do separate them as a formal
matter, but that is as a classification: a mental convenience,
based, of course, upon observable differences. But in all events
substance precedes procedure in our theoretical scheme of
things; and much of our procedural law is written in terms of
the substantive law. For example when the Code provides that
an action shall be brought "by the real party in interest" it
means the person having a substantive legal interest. The code
rule, too, that a complaint shall state the facts constituting the
plaintiff's "cause of action" means that the facts showing that
the plaintiff has a legal interest subject to judicial recognition
are to be stated. It can fairly be said that we have about half
a dozen very general rules of code pleading (all in terms of the
substantive law) which cover about 90 per cent of the cases.
When we have written down the rules of the real party in interest; the joinder of parties; the joinder of actions; the complaint and answer rules; the demurrer and amendment rules;
we have included all of any general importance. They give the
lie to the common assumption that if one knows the general
rules or principles he knows the law. We could teach a ten
year old boy all of these code rules on pleading, but his effective
knowledge of the law would be so meagre that he would have to
qualify as a "constitutional lawyer" if he could qualify at all.
The reason is that after all procedure is as broad as the
entire substantive law, and that you cannot intelligibly deal
with it without at the same time dealing with its substantive
co-efficient. Food and man are two different things; but the
latter is worse than useless without the former; and so it is
with substantive and procedural law.
But in any event we have traditionally settled the substantive
law on the basis of pre-existing rules. Legal interests are conceived of as preceding their judicial recognition. Today we
have a school of legal philosophy which energetically denies the
validity of that concept. The most notable exponent of that
school is Mr. Jerome Frank of the Chicago and New York Bars.
His book, Law and the Moderm Mind, is of immense interest and
helpfulness to every student of law, and every practicing attorney. 4 His view is that the law cannot be defined in terms of a
4 Those who care to pursue the inquiry further will find articles by him
in 80 U. of Penn. L. Rev. 18, 233 (1931) and 26 Illinois L. R. 645, 761

(1932).
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Rational Formal Science; it can only be defined in terms of its
results. Thus the only law we have is that which the courts
evidence in their judgments. It is a Philosophy of Behaviorism
in Law; and while it emphasizes a possible point of view, the
answer to his argument is that law can be defined in any way
we wish to define it. When all is said and done it is difficult to
conceive of a workable system of law which indulges in no preconceptions, and which makes no attempt to systematize, formalize and philosophize as to the results. Few lawyers and
teachers have accepted Mr. Frank's position in its entirety; and
we can safely go on with our postulate that substantive legal
interests are pre-existent. We must not make the mistake, however, of assuming that it is anything more than a postulate;
and that legal rules and principles are anything more than
mental concepts, subject to change without notice whenever a
change is shown to be desirable. Because a thing is new is no
valid objection to it of itself, even in the law. Much of the
courts' difficulties with the Declaratory Judgments Act arise
out of their failure to recognize that.
This short excursion into legal philosophy is necessary at this
point because we cannot discuss the problems suggested above
without setting out our foundations. It is impossible to begin
any place except at the beginning. It is no good trying to talk
about, much less to understand, the procedure under the Declaratory Judgments Act until we have settled the assumptions and
pre-conceptions upon which the talk bases its foundation. All
legal talk has a background of some brand of legal philosophy
and it is always well that it be articulated and expressly defined,
and not left to inference and misunderstanding.
II.
Just a few additional words as to the non-procedural side of
the problem. The Indiana Act is the Uniform Act, which up to
1930 had been adopted in fifteen states. The decisions from
other states are therefore a valuable assistance in the discussion
of the problem. The act has been held constitutional in every
instance where it has been attacked (including Indiana) (an
early Michigan case to the contrary has been overruled) ; and its
constitutional validity has been assumed in a number of other
cases.5 The attack upon it is principally the jurisdictional one,
5 The cases are collected and discussed in Professor Borchard's article
cited infra. n. 10.
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that it constitutes an invasion of the judicial function, being an
imposition by the legislature on the courts of a non-judicial
function. The important conclusion from the cases upholding
its constitutionality on that score is that a fortiori the courts
could have assumed the jurisdiction without the aid of the
statute. There is nothing in the usual constitution or statute
(and there certainly is nothing in the Indiana Constitution and
statutes) dealing with the jurisdiction of our courts of general
jurisdiction which can fairly be said to be a limitation which
has been removed by the Declaratory Judgments Act. If it
were a constitutional limitation it could not be removed by a
statute. The constitutions and statutes give almost unlimited
jurisdiction in law and equity (and our statute adds this: "all
other causes, matters and proceedings") 6 and thus it is apparent
that the refusal of the courts to deal with the subject-matter
covered by the act was a self-imposed limitation. The courts
could act, but they would not. The closest judicial expression of
this proposition is to be found in the case of Guaranty Trust Co.
v. Hannoy.7 In that case Bankes, L. J., said this: "I can not
doubt that had the Court of Chancery in those days (before
1852) thought it expedient to make merely declaratory judgments they would have claimed and exercised the right to do
so." Certainly if this is now a proper judicial power, it was
always a proper judicial power, which the courts did not, for
some reason or other, exercise. 8 The act is therefore simply a
command to them to exercise it, and consequently it is valid.
Although the act says "courts shall have the power" it literally
means "courts shall use the power." It is commonly assumed
that the legislature cannot tell the courts what to do; but that
is not true. Every statute tells, expressly or by implication, the
courts what to do (that is, what rule to apply), and the sole
objection to the so-called expository or interpretative act is its
impolite form (if it be not retroactive, in which case it may be
invalid under the 14th amendment but not under the doctrine
of the separation of powers).9
The question is still open as to whether or not the United
States District Court must or can follow a State Declaratory
61376 Burns, 1926.
7 (1915) 2 K. B. 536, 568.
8 Cf. Ashnelot R. v. Elliott, 58 N. H. 451 (1818) (semble).

9 Time does not permit a detailed defense of that statement at this point.
The statement is the result of an investigation of the hundreds of cases

upon the point which the present author plans to present at a later date.
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Judgments Act; and whether or not a Federal Act would be
valid. The present state of the case suggests a negative answer
to both questions. The Supreme Court of the United States has
gone out of its way to discourage the procedure in the Federal
Courts. The first question is as to whether or not the Conformity Act compels jurisdiction. It is thought that it does not.
It deals with practice and pleading; and this is a matter of
jurisdiction. There is in truth considerable authority for the
proposition that the equity jurisdiction of the Federal Courts
cannot be increased by state legislation. But it does not follow
that it cannot be increased by the courts themselves, or by
Federal legislation; despite the fact that the Supreme Court has
given a very narrow construction to the constitutional and
statutory grant of equity power to the Federal Courts. If a
Federal Court wished to take jurisdiction there is nothing to
prevent it (unless the court finally indulges in a very reactionary interpretation of the judicial power clause of the Federal
Constitution) ; and a state statute should have no more than persuasive authority upon the point.
As to whether a Federal Act would be valid turns also upon
the final construction of the words "case or controversy;" and
"equity" in the Federal Constitution. Despite the common
assumption to the contrary it is not at all impossible to sustain
a Federal act. The cases and the problem have been most adequately discussed by Professor Edwin M. Borchard of the Yale
Law School, 10 and for that reason it is unnecessary and undesirable to elaborate upon the point in this paper.
III.
The usefulness of the act can be briefly exemplified by calling
attention to some of the cases which have been decided under it.
Mr. Farabaugh and Mr. Arnold summarized a good many of
the cases which had been decided up to the time their article was
written, and I shall confine myself primarily to a few of the
more interesting cases decided since that date.
The following actions have been upheld: It was assumed in
Axton v. Goodman" that it was possible to secure a declaration
10In 31 Columbia L. R. 561 (April, 1931), and see Nashville, C. & St.
L. By. v. Wallace, - U. S. -, 53 S. Ct. 345 (1933) where the Supreme
Court in effect accepts Professor Borchard's views.
11 205 Ky. 382, 265 S. W. 806 (1924).
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as to the rights of a political party at the polls (as to the appointment of inspectors); it was held in Craig v. Commor's of Sinking Fund,12 that the court could declare the rights of public
officers between themselves; in Sarner v. Kantor,13 the court
decreed that the leasor defendant did not have a right to withhold consent to the assignment of the lease by the leasee; in City
of Corbin v. Underwood,14 a jailer secured a decree concerning
his rights against the city as to the transportation of prisoners;
in Dodge v. Campbell15 the plaintiff secured a decree as to the
validity of a former divorce decree; in Moore v. Moore,1 an
auditor of state as an individual secured a decree as to his rights
against himself as an officer; in Baumann v. Baumann17 a
woman secured a decree that she was the wife of H, and that the
defendant was not his wife; in Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton &
Elm Leasing Co.' a tenant's right to sub-let was affirmed; in
Morecraft v. Taylor'9 the plaintiff secured a declaration that he
was the illegitimate child of the defendant; in Wingate v.
Flynn20 the court determined whether the term of a public office
was six or fourteen years. There are a large number of cases
where the courts have construed contracts, deeds and other
written instruments.
Following are the more striking of the recent English cases.
In Llandudno U. D. C. v. Woods 21 the court decreed that the
defendant clergyman was not entitled to hold services in certain
places without the plaintiff's consent; that a mortgage (not yet
due) was invalid for illegality;22 that a sub-agent, who had
bargained for a secret commission would become indebted to the
principals of the agent who employed him, when and as he
should receive any portion of such commission;23 that an organ
in a mission church belonged to the plaintiff;24 that a certain
12203
'3205
14 221
15 220

N. Y. S.
N. Y. S.
Ky. 413,
N. Y. S.

236
760
298
262

(1924).
(1924).
S. W. 1090 (1927).
(1927).

16 147 Va. 460, 137 S. E. 488 (1927).
17228 N. Y. S. 539, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1928-9).
18 229 N. Y. S. 86 (1928).

19234 N. Y. S. 2 (1929), ace., Miller v. Currie, 242 N. W. 570 (Wis.
1932), and see note 46 Harv. L. R. 336 (1932).
20 249 N. Y. S. 351 (1931).
21 (1899) 2 Ch. 705.

22 Chapman v. Michaelson, (1908) 2 Ch. 612; 1909) 1 Ch. 238.
23 Powell & Thomas v. Evan Jones & Co., (1905) 1 K. B. 11.
24

Rawlinson v. Mort, (1905) 93 L. T. 555.
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proposed act by a labor union society would be ultra vires;25 that
26
a certain foreign judgment was invalid.
Practically all of the cases denying a decree involved situations where a cause of action for damages or possession had
accrued.2 7 A decree was also denied in a case where the statute
questioned had been repealed. 28 In other cases it was held that
the plaintiff had no legal interest to be protected. 2 9 It has also
been held in North Carolina that racial status cannot be de30
clared.
It will be seen that the act has been rather extensively used,
and that the cases present some novel situations. Outside of
the cases construing contracts and other written instruments
and declaring status the most common use of the act is in the
field of public law, where a decree is sought as to the public
duties of officers. If proposed official action were unconstitutional it could, before the act, be enjoined; now its validity and
meaning can be determined even although a constitutional question is not involved. The possibilities in this field are immense;
and the reader is referred to an article in the January, 1932
issue of the Yale Law JournaZ1 by an English author, W. Ivor
Jennings, entitled: "Declaratory Judgments Against Public Authorities in England" for an excellent discussion of those possibilities. The old remedies of mandate and prohibition were very
inadequate and the Declaratory Judgment is a notable step forward in this field. Professor Borchard, to whom must be given
much of the credit for the progress made in this field, has recently published an exhaustive article on the general subject,
and the reader is referred to it for balance of the decided cases
32
and a thorough discussion as to the theory of the act.
25 Cope v. Crossinghaim, (1908) 2 Ch. 624, 637; (1909) 2 Ch. 148.
2
GEllerman Lines, Ltd. v. Read, 44 Times Rep. 7.
27 See, e. g., Goldberg & Sons v. Gilet Bldg. Corp., 237 N. Y. S. 258
(1929), and Koleikan v. Hall, 27 Haw. 420 (1923), Cf. Borchard, The
Declaratory Judgment as an Exclusive or Alternative Remedy, 31 Mich.
L. R. 180 (1932).
28 Wendell v. City of Peoria,274 IMI. 613, 113 N. E. 918 (1916).
29 See, e. g., Perry v. City of Elizabethton, 160 Tenn. 102, 22 S. W.
(2d) 359 (1930); Dietz v. Zimmer, 231 Ky. 546, 21 S. W. (2d) 999 (1930).
This latter case could well have been decided the other way. See infra,
n. 34.
30 Ex parte Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932).
31 Vol. 41, p. 407.
32 Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 Harv. L. R. 793 (1932).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

IV.
Getting back to the principal problems, it seems necessary in
the light of what has been said already to define the judicial
function. I have come to the conclusion that the judicial function can only be defined as the power to finadly recognize legal
interests.33 Two main errors commonly creep in to the picture.
First, it is commonly assumed that the judicial function is the
settlement of disputes. But witness the innumerable cases in
which the executive settles dispute; as for example an Industrial
Board; tax commission, etc. The only distinction between the
two is that a judicial settlement is final; an administrative
settlement is subject to judicial review. It is true that a court
can finally settle disputes as to law and fact; but a controversy
was never a sine qua non of judicial action. Suppose, for example, P and D have had an automobile accident, and D admits
his liability and agrees to pay the damages; P can nevertheless
begin an action against him and secure a judgment. Or, suppose
for example that D's note to P becomes due on June 1st; and D
promises to pay on June 3rd, when he will get the proceeds of a
loan; P nevertheless could sue on June 2nd and recover. Even
if D had made a perfect tender the same result would follow.
Most of our actions to quiet title are based upon the mere possibility of a controversy rather than a present one. The reason is
that the abolition of the law of self-help made the courts the
sole mechanism for the final recognition of legal rights and
protected the defendant and his property against P's own enforcement of even undisputed rights. At least half of the business of the courts is a stepping stone to the collection of an
admitted liability; and there is no controversy raised or settled.
One is foreclosed; but that arises out of the doctrine of res
judicata and the theory that judicial jurisdiction is final.
Second, it is commonly assumed that a court deals only with
so-called secondary or remedial rights. In this connection we
classify legal rights into primary rights and secondary rights;
the first is a pre-conceived legal interest whose ownership is not
based on wrongful conduct; the second is based on wrongful
conduct and is usually a right to damages. Thus title to prop33

The detailed substantiation of this statement cannot be made at this

time. The statement again is the result of a thorough investigation of the
cases bearing on the point. At a future date the present author hopes

to develop the proposition in detail.
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erty generally; and the right to the performance of a contract
are primary rights; rights to damages for trespass and for
breach of contract are secondary rights. But there are innumerable cases where the courts deal with primary rights. In actions
to quiet title, and most actions in rem that is true. It is true
in ejectment and replevin. The wrongful conduct of the defendant in those two latter actions is not precedent to the
asserted right to possession; it is simply precedent to court interference; there was thought to be no sense in rendering a
judgment for possession of property against a defendant unless
he have the possession wrongfully. If there were a dispute as
to his future right to possession the proper action would be
under the Declaratory Judgments Act, and not ejectment or
replevin.
The courts have long been accustomed to settling title to real
property; there is obviously no theoretical and certainly no
practical reason why they should not in a given case settle the
primary or property rights of parties in relation to contracts,
status and public officers. The only objection is the novelty
of the practice.
There is no valid distinction between
an action to construe a will and one to construe a contract; to
declare the title to real estate and one to declare the title to
personal property, tangible or intangible; to decide the questions
of marriage and divorce, or legitimacy in connection with property rights, or to decide them in connection with personal rights;
to decide the duties of public officers in cases involving constitutional questions, and to decide them in cases not involving
constitutional questions.
The requirement that the plaintiff be legally interested expressly contained in the act disposes of all the objections raised
on the basis that the court is deciding a moot case, or giving
free advice. The plaintiff is legally interested if he claims any
right, power, privilege or immunity against the defendant to
which the substantive law gives cognizance. The basis, for
example, of a voter's action to question the eligibility of a candidate for public office is the voter's legal privilege to participate
in a valid election. At least the Indiana Supreme Court in the
recent prosecutors case has said that every voter has such a
legal privilege.3 4 The court in such a case should insist upon
34 See Robinson v. Moser, 179 N. E. 270 (1931).

Cf. Nixon v. Condon,

52 S. Ct. 484, holding that P may recover damages. A Kentucky case to
the contrary ought not to be followed. See Dietz v. Zimmer, 231 Ky. 546,
21 S. W. (2d) 999 (1930) supra n.29.
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proper parties to the action, so that the result would be res
judicatc. The plaintiff should sue as representative of a class;
and the candidates and representatives of their party should be
made defendants.
The real purpose therefore of the Declaratory Judgments Act
is to give interested parties an opportunity to secure judicial
(and therefore final) recognition of many legal interests with
which heretofore the courts have, for no very good reason, refused to deal. Particularly it imposes on the courts the mandatory duty of giving judicial recognition to many primary and
public rights and duties which previously were not subject to it.
If P has a secondary right to damages for breach of contract
the law compels him to seek judicial recognition of it before he
enforces it; now, for example, he may secure judicial recognition
of the primary rights arising out of his contract prior to breach,
as a step in their final enforcement.

V.
When we come, now, to the first question suggested: that is,
must there be a jury trial in any or all cases under the act, it
will be seen that I have proceeded upon the assumption that
proceedings under the act are essentially equitable in their
nature. If that be true the answer, of course, is easy; a jury
is never necessary, although there is nothing to prevent a court
in any given case from taking the advice of a jury on a disputed
question of fact. Whether or not that is a proper assumption
depends of course upon a proper construction of the act, in the
light of the decided cases.
Section 935 of the act provides that "When a proceeding under
this act involves the determination of an issue of fact, such issue
may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of
fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in the court
in which the proceeding is pending." It is another general principle of generous proportions and it is very apparent that the
authors of the act have done a very handsome job of passing
the buck. It is obviously a non-commital statement which can
be paraphrased to read as follows: "If the action is legal then
a jury trial shall be had, if it is equitable then no jury trial shall
be had." We find similar statements in other statutes. Equiva35 Sec. 680. 9 Burns, 1929.
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lent statements in our act on the disbarment of attorneys; and
on the action of partition have been construed as sanctioning a
jury trial; while an identical provision in our mechanics lien
statute has been construed to the contrary.
If, as has been suggested above, the first section of the act
must be paraphrased to read: "Courts of record within their
respective jurisdictions shall use (instead of have) the power"
to render declaratory judgments it seems very apparent that a
jury trial is never available as a matter of right. The statute is
simply a command to the courts, as courts of equity, to exercise
their jurisdiction. It is clear that the judicial power involved
is not a common law one. That question must be settled (under
our accepted construction of the constitutional provision as to
jury trial) purely upon an historical basis. One can find no
Common Law Action and very few, if any, common law precedents of any sort on the score; but the Courts of Equity in
actions to construe wills; to render mandatory or restraining
injunctions; to remove clouds on title, and other similar actions
did exercise the power which is here involved. It seems reasonably clear that on an historical classification the power involved
is equitable and not common law. This conclusion is borne out
by the fact that in England the first statute and the first court
rules on the subject were addressed exclusively to the Court of
Chancery. Practically all of the English cases have been, and
are now, brought in that court; and the few cases which we find
in the other courts can be explained on the basis that as a practical matter the English courts are now quite similar to our code
system in practical results, and that the Court of King's Bench
now has equity powers. After a rather thorough investigation
of the English cases I can find no case involving the question of
jury trial, but it certainly is fair to say that the practice under
the act in England is regarded as essentially equitable.
If we regard the act as a grant of power, rather than a command to use an existing equitable power, the question of jury
trial is not so easy; but the same reasons ought, it would seem,
to compel the same conclusion. The action would be statutory
and as to whether or not it was subject to jury trial would depend on whether or not it was essentially legal or equitable, and
that in turn depends upon the historical aspects of the situation;
is its character such as a court of common law, or a court of
equity commonly dealt with? We have many statutory actions,
and while it might be possible to rather successfully quarrel
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with some of the results, on the whole, it can fairly be said that
the test suggested is the one the courts have used. We have no
express provision, for example, in our divorce, mechanics lien,
quiet title, partition and foreclosure of mortgages statutes on
the subject of jury trial, and the reader knows that in some of
those actions a jury trial is available; in others it is not. On
such a basis it would seem to follow that essentially all actions
under this act are equitable in their nature, and that a jury
trial would not be a matter of right.
I cannot find that the question has been squarely presented
for decision, but I must admit that the language of the cases is
against that result. The cases are as follows: in the leading
3 6 the section of the statute in quescase of Petition of Kariher,
tion was quoted and it was said that the section avoided any
problem under the constitutional provision on jury trial, as it
saved the jury trial in a proper case. It is a reasonable inference from the language of the case that the court thought that a
jury trial was a matter of right in some cases. It cites as
authority three earlier Connecticut cases.37 Those cases, however, were decided under a very early statute, which after all
was simply a statutory action to quiet title. It was there held
that a jury trial was available because equity never had jurisdiction to try title to real estate. The cases are therefore not in
point, and could today, in light of the present repudiation of that
latter postulate, be fairly said to be erroneously decided. Courts
of equity always had jurisdiction to decide title, but for a while
refused to exercise it.
In Holly Sugar Corp. v. Fritzler,88 it was said (but simply as
dictum) that the action "might have been submitted to a jury
under Sec. 9, but the defendants have waived the question." The
action was to construe a contract, and to have the court declare
that the plaintiff was not liable. Certainly there was no common
law antecedent of such an action. Apparently the court misread
the section and was under the erroneous impression that the
section affirmatively provided for a jury trial in every case. But
it says merely that an issue of fact "may be tried in the same
manner as in other civil actions." Our code defines "civil ac36 284 Pa. 455, 131 AtI. 265 (1926).
3t Miles v. Strong, 68 Conn. 273, 36 A. 55 (1896).
Layton v. Bailey,
77 Conn. 22, 58 A. 355 (1904); Dawson v. Town of Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 61
A. 101 (1905).
38296 P. 206 (Wyo. 1931).
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tions" as both legal and equitable actions; and if we substitute
those words for "civil" the real non-committal import of the
statute is apparent.
There is a similar dictum in the case of Town Board of Greece
v. Murry.3 9 I think those are the only cases discussing the point,
and it is clear that the question is still an open one. There are
no English cases on the point, but practically all the cases in
that country are brought in the Chancery Division.
Two New Jersey cases also point the other way, however. In
4 0 and Union Trust Co. v. Georke Co.,41 it
Paterson v. Currier,
was held that an action to construe a will, where the plaintiff
claimed a legal and not an equitable interest in real property
devised by the will could only be maintained under the Declaratory Judgments Act in a law court. The decision is based upon
the first section of the act, which provides that "courts, within
their respective jurisdictions" shall have power over an action
for a declaratory judgment. The specific question could probably only be presented in that form in New Jersey and the Federal Courts; but there are of course, innumerable cases in England which as a practical matter are contrary to the view expressed by the New Jersey court. A literal reading of the act
suggests that result; but for the reasons heretofore advanced it
is submitted that those cases ought not to be followed. They
assume, in any event, that it is impossible that the Legislature
had enhanced the law of the jurisdiction of the Equity Courts
by giving a new equitable remedy; but that it had enhanced the
jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts. That it is within the
power of the Legislature to give a new equitable right and
remedy is, of course, settled 42 Just why the New Jersey court
should conclude that the Legislature could and did enhance the
jurisdiction of the common law courts; but could not or did not
enhance the jurisdiction of the equity courts is hard to explain.
39 223 N. Y. S. 606 (1927).
40 78 N. J. Eq. 48, 129 A. 711 (1925).

41 142 A. 566 (N. J.Eq. 1928).
42 See e. g. People, ex rel Lemo= v. Elmwre, 256 N. Y. 489, 177 N. E. 14

(1931). On the face of it this increases the jurisdiction of the Equity
court, but only, N. B., if we assume what is certainly not true, that equitable jurisdiction was special and restricted. The only proper view of
Equity jurisdiction is that it was a residuum of the judicial power after
the common law jurisdictions were subtracted. Judicial power like substantive rights is a broad concept whose theoretical content is constant and
infinite, regardless of its practical use from generation to generation. The
legislature may deal with its exercise, but not its creation.
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If the common law courts in New Jersey adopted the same reasoning as the equity courts the act means nothing, for those
courts could say to the plaintiff "We never had jurisdiction to
construe a will; so if you have a remedy it is some place else."
Incidentally, of course, the New Jersey cases will support
Farabaugh's and Arnold's conclusion that the act gives to the
justice of the peace courts in Indiana jurisdiction under the act,
because they are courts of record. If the New Jersey cases
fairly say that the act creates a new common law and not an
equity jurisdiction, it confers on the justice of the peace court
of Indiana a new kind of common law jurisdiction. If they
fairly say that the Legislature cannot create a new equity jurisdiction, then they are inconclusive on that point. I suppose that
this latter is all they really decide. For the reasons advanced
heretofore it seems to me that the act ought to be construed
not. as granting jurisdiction, but as commanding the exercise
of an existing jurisdiction in an existing court of equity. If
that is a proper construction of the act the justice of the peace
in Indiana is unaffected by the act for it is settled that he has
no equity power. I find nothing in the Indiana Constitution, or
in the -statutes on our courts of general jurisdiction which constitutes a limitation which the present act removes. Our general statutes on jurisdiction of courts are certainly as broad as
the Constitution and it is impossible to construe this act as an
additional grant of power. I still think it clear that the courts
of equity always had this power, and that they simply did not
exercise it. The act is thus a legislative statement that they
ought to exercise it. Section 6 makes the exercise of jurisdiction in any given case a matter of sound discretion, so that the
ill effects of requiring a court to render a judgment upon every
legal interest is mitigated. As pointed out above the English
courts have expressly taken that view. Personally I should
think it most unfortunate if a proper construction of the act
gives jurisdiction to the justice of the peace in Indiana and also
a jury trial. Much of the value of a proceeding under the act
is a speedy, conclusive and intelligent decision on the point involved. Equity procedure today is much better equipped to
reach that result than is the common law trial, with its delays,
its inconclusiveness (because the verdict of the jury is reached
only by red tape methods, and because it is possible to have so
many mistakes in a jury trial), and its rather unintelligent
results. Jury trial is a valid machinery in those cases involving
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common standards, but most cases under this act involve essentially legal points. A disputed point of fact could always, even
if the proceeding be held to be equitable, be presented to a jury
for advice.
VI.
On the last question suggested; does the code of procedure
apply, the answer seems to be easy; and this time sustained by
the authorities. The act says nothing on the general subject;
but Section 11 of the act does deal with the question of parties.
It provides that "all persons shall be made parties who have or
claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration,
and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which involves
the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard,
and if the statute, ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney-general of the state shall also be served
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard."
Under the last provision it has been held that service of notice
on the attorney-general is a jurisdictional prerequisite. 43
The first part of the section is in almost the identical language
of the code provisions on the joinder of parties, and it is believed
that it adds nothing to that requirement. (In the first reported
case in Indiana decided under the act our Supreme Court cited
the real party in interest statute and not Section 11.) The test
is one of legaZ interest, rather than of actual interest, and that
can only be determined in each case by a reference to the substantive law on the subject.
As to whether or not the balance of the Code on Procedure
applies to an action under the act does not seem to me to be a
debatable question. Our Code applies to all civil actions. It has
never been questioned but that it applies to new statutory actions
created after its adoption. It expressly applies to all equitable
actions.
But it has been argued that the demurrer statute could not
apply because "the purpose of the act was to aford relief before
injury had been sustained and a cause of action arose."
It is submitted that that position is based upon the erroneous
conclusion that "cause of action" in the demurrer and complaint
43

See Cumings v. Shipp, 156 Tenm. 395, 3 S. W. (2d) 1062 (1929).
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statutes includes only secondary rights. I have already pointed
out that many actions are brought which seek the judicial recognition of primary rights. I think it very clear that we should
define the phrase "cause of action" as meaning any legal interest.4 4 The requirement of the complaint statute is then that
the plaintiff state the operative facts which show that he has a
substantive legal interest on which he is entitled to a judicial
recognition in the form of a judgment. The test of the validity
of a complaint under the Declaratory Judgments Act is the same
as in any other case: has the plaintiff stated operative facts
showing that he has some legal interest subject to judicial recognition? It is true that he may, for example, allege that his
rights under an alleged contract are uncertain; he may make no
allegations as to the proper construction of the contract; the
action is for the sole purpose of removing the uncertainty; still
on the face of the proceeding he has necessarily alleged the
facts showing a contract right, which theoretically to start
with is what the judgment finally declares it to be. A demurrer
for insufficient facts would challenge that right; just as it would
challenge a secondary right for damages, where the facts failed
to disclose affirmatively that the plaintiff in truth had the right
he is attempting to assert. It is not necessary in the latter case
that the plaintiff allege or prove that the defendant denies his
right; and for the same reason a similar allegation should be
unnecessary in an action under the act. The cases talk about the
necessity of a dispute or controversy under the act; but the
reason is that usually that would be necessary to the exercise of
44 See The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 203, 295 (1931).
Cf.
Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process,
45 Harv. L. R. 617 (1932). In the article last cited, Professor Arnold
defends the proposition that much is to be said for the older technic of
explaining substantive results in the language of procedure. He concludes
that there is support in that proposition for Dean Clark's definition of the
code cause of action as the facts which can conveniently be tried in
one legal proceeding. There is, however, an obvious distinction between
explaining a result in terms of procedure, and in deciding substantive rights

with a view to procedural convenience. It would seem quite obvious that
the substantive rights of litigants are entitled to the additional considerations which we normally recognize as part of the judicial process of
judging human interests. The formal distinctions between substance and
procedure are reasonably clear, despite the fact that one is rather useless
without the other; and the same policy obviously cannot always decide
both a question of substance and one of procedure. If there is any reason
at all for maintaining the formal distinction between them it is just that.
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the discretionary jurisdiction granted by the act; it is not necessary to jurisdiction in the strict sense, any more than in the
ordinary case to collect a debt.
It is true, too, that there are cases which hold that under the
act if the parties really do not disagree on their rights, or a
secondary right has arisen, the court will not render a declaratory judgment; but those cases give effect to the equity rules
that equity will not do a useless act, nor will it act if a legal
remedy is adequate. There is nothing in the act which requires
a dispute; and in fact it gives power in any case where the decree will "terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty ;"
and it must be assumed that the word "or" was used intentionally.
On the face of it the act gives the privilege of securing a judgment upon every legal interest. Thus a bank, for example, the
instant a promissory note was given it, could secure a declaration that on the date agreed upon the promisor would be legally
bound to repay the amount of the loan. However the far-reaching consequences of the act are limited by the practical consideration that the owners of legal interests are not going to expend
the time and money to reduce their uncontroverted obligations
to judgment unless there is some real occasion for that action.
Section 6 expressly gives the courts some discretionary power,
and common principles of equity jurisdiction would supply the
others. In a given case the court could well refuse to render a
decree. The fact of a present or future controversy is thus a
material fact as to the court's discretionary exercise of its
powers, but never a condition precedent to its jurisdiction in the
strict sense of that term. And, of course, it may well be that as
a matter of pleading the burden ought to be put upon the plaintiff to bring himself within both the strict and discretionary
jurisdiction of the court. The cases which talk about the necessity of a controversy can easily be explained on that basis.
The point suggests another point of pleading. The law of
Indiana seems settled to the effect that in an action to construe
a will the question of the propriety of the plaintiff's asserted
construction requires an affirmative answer. 45 If that analogy
is followed in similar cases brought under this act it will be
necessary for the defendant to file an affirmative answer setting
forth his construction of the instrument in question.
45

Hawes v. Keplen, 28 Ind. App. 306 (1902); Rothschild v. Weinthel,
191 Ind. 85 (1921).
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There is an apparent 'conflict as to whether our rule on the
materiality of the prayer for relief applies. But the conflict is
only .apparent, for the case first cited immediately hereafter did
not arise in a code state.
46
It was held in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Richmond (in which

case the court could not tell whether the plaintiff sought an injunction or a declaration, of rights) that the complaint should

have been more specific if the plaintiff wished the latter. Under
our Code rule to the effect that the prayer for relief is no part
of the complaint, and our statutes abolishing "the theory of the
case" such a decision ought to be impossible in Indiana. A re47
cent New York case is in accord with that conclusion.
It was said in Jefferson Co. v. Ciinton,4 8 that the act did not

repeal the code of civil procedure.

In this same case it was said

that the counter claim statute applied to actions under the act.
Previous decisions on that point are cited in the opinion. It was
assumed in the cases cited in the note that a demurrer for insuffi49
cient facts was a proper procedure.
A demurrer to an answer was assumed to be valid in the last

decided Indiana case. 50

Demurrers for defect of parties have

been used and not questioned. 5 1
The code and equity procedure on the joinder of actions has
been applied.52

The code rules on amendment have been applied without
question. 53

It was held in Morton v. Pacific Coast Co., 54 that if the action

were an action in rem, the general statutes on publication of
notice applied, so that non-residents could be properly brought
46 167 Conn. 117, 139 A. 702 (1928).

City of Buffalo v. International Ry. Co., 240 N. Y. S. 113 (1930).
48 236 Ky. 614, 33 S. W. (2d) 601 (1931).
47
49

Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 277 P. 487 (Cal. 1929);
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 277 P. 489 (Cal. 1929); Holly Sugar Corp. V.
Fritzler, 296 P. 206 (Wyo. 1931); McIntyre v. Consolidated Water Co.,
270 P. 444 (1928).
-o Enmeier v. Blaize, 179 N. E. 783 (1932) (Ind. Sup.).
51 Morton v. Pacific Const. Co., 283 P. 281 (Ariz. 1929); Harrill v.
American Home Mfg. Co., 36 S. W. (2d) 888 (1931, Tenn.); Holly Sugar
Corp. v. Fritzler, 296 P. 206 (Wyo. 1931).
52 Allen v. Carsted Realty Corp., 231 N. Y. S. 585 (1929); and Holly
Sugar Corp. ,u. Fritzler, 296 P. 206 (Wyo. 1931).
53 Henderson v. Oroville-Wyandotte Irr. Dist., 277 P. 487 (Cal. 1929);
Rutherford v. Rutherford, 277 P. 489 (Cal. 1929).
54 283 P. 281 (Ariz. 1929).
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within the jurisdiction of the court. In the first Indiana case on
the subject 5 5 it was assumed that the real party in interest statute; the answer statute; the statutes on special findings of fact
and conclusions of law; all applied to a proceeding under the
act. The last Indiana case was decided on a demurrer to an
56
affirmative answer.
I find no case where it was questioned but that the Code of
Procedure applied to actions under the Declaratory Judgments
Act, and it seems very clear that there can be no doubt but that
it does apply.
5
s Zoercher v. Agler, 172 N. E. 186, 907 (1930).
56Supm n. 50.

